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ABSTRACT
Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) application provide a whole
new set of possibilities to drive efficiency of industrial production
forward. However, with the higher degree of integration among
systems, comes a plethora of new threats to the latter, as they are not
yet designed to be broadly reachable and interoperable. To mitigate
these vast amount of new threats, systematic and automated test
methods are necessary. This comprehensiveness can be achieved
by thorough threat modeling. In order to automate security test, we
present an approach to automate the testing process from threat
modeling onward, closing the gap between threat modeling and
automated test case generation.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Computer systems organization → Embedded and cyber-
physical systems; • Security and privacy → Network secu-
rity; Systems security; • Networks→ Cyber-physical networks.
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1 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The increasing connectivity of cyber-physical objects in critical
environments like industrial production or autonomous driving
leads to an increasing vulnerability of the overall IoT-based, cyber-
physical systems (CPS). To ensure security in large, heterogeneous,
distributed and dynamic environments, a clear understanding of the
related properties and threats and how they are addressed during
the entire system life cycle is necessary. Hence, such environments
result in major challenges and a high effort for conventional ap-
proaches to quality assurance (QA) such as testing - still one of
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or
classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed
for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation
on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored.
For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s).
CECC 2019, November 14–15, 2019, Munich, Germany
© 2019 Copyright held by the owner/author(s).
ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-7296-1/19/11. . . $15.00
https://doi.org/10.1145/3360664.3362698
the most widely applied approaches in industry. Conventional test
and QA are characterized by manual tasks and script-based test
automation, which limits the flexibility required for adapting to
heterogeneous and dynamic environments [4]. Furthermore, ade-
quately addressing security issues requires a deep integration with
related activities and tools for model-driven security engineering.
This work presents following contributions in its next sections:
• Abstraction through system and threat modeling;
• Feedback-directed test case generation (TCG) using attack
patterns based on the threats derived from the model;
• Automated execution of the generated security tests.
So far, only few practical efforts are known to automatically
derive real-system executable test cases out of threat modeling
(e.g.[2]) where none of these uses a widely-known threat modeling
tool.
2 THREAT MODELING AND TEST CASE
GENERATION
This section describes the components of threat-model driven TCG.
Figure 1 provides an overview.
2.1 Threat Modeling
In order to industrialize security testing, a model-based approach,
abstracting the tests, is necessary for ensuring reusable test build-
ing blocks through the transaction from one test case to another.
Originally, Microsoft’s Security Development Lifecycle contained
threat modeling as a tool to identify security threats with the goal
of creating a secure system design [6]. The concept has been ex-
panded and transferred to various application domains and settings
since [10]. The approach uses data flow diagrams (DFDs), that con-
tain all relevant system components of an SUT and to model how
they interact with each other in terms of data exchange. In order to
derive relevant threats to the SUT, it uses threat templates that are
usually derived by a commonly known methodology (e.g. STRIDE,
VAST) and maps them to the DFD. This yields a list of threats that
is both holistic and specific to the SUT. This can also be extended
with security building blocks that refine the threat derivation [7].
The two basic components of a threat model therefore pose an ideal
tool to achieve the system modeling for security TCG: the DFD
represent an abstraction of the SUT, while the according threat tem-
plate represent an abstraction of the threats to the system. As the
modeling combines these two into a single model, threats relevant
to the SUT can be derived (in practice as XML output) and used to
automatically generating attack scenarios as test cases. In order to
provide meaningful threats, the latter are preselected from a threat
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library and (as yet manually) run through a risk assessment matrix
before being applied to the model.
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Figure 1: Automated Testing Process
2.2 Test Case Generation
Automated security testing ranges from generating random input
(fuzzing) [8] to security testing based on models [5]. The presented
approach targets the generation of interaction sequences according
to protocols used in IoT systems, the typical domain of MBT. How-
ever, instead of developing a full model, a list of commands (e.g.,
protocol messages) is specified and a test generator from functional
testing is applied to create interaction sequences. Methods for gen-
erating sequences are based on random approaches, search-based
strategies, genetic algorithms, reinforcement learning [1]. Online
feedback-directed testing is used to determine viable sequences and
to avoid generating illegal sequences violating protocol constraints.
This approach creates sequences by executing each selected com-
mand during test generation and evaluating the feedback (response
of the SUT) before adding them to the sequence. Thus, the approach
is able to generate long valid sequences (positive tests) that achieve
a deep coverage of internal states as well as sequences that lead to
an invalid command call after a number of valid interactions (nega-
tive tests). Security is addressed by augmenting the list of regular
commands with the implementation of attack patterns obtained
from publicly available catalogs like the Common Vulnerabilities
and Exposures (CVE) [9], e.g. message flooding. Each attack pattern
is implemented in the same way as a regular command call, making
them accessible to the test generator. Hence, the test generator will
typically create interaction sequences that consist of valid chunks
of sequences interleaved by malicious interactions from attacks.
The selection and prioritization of the attacks applied in test gener-
ation is controlled by the input provided by the threat model. An
attack pattern is included if a corresponding vulnerability has been
specified in the model.
2.3 Automated Test Execution
Test generation produces a set of executable test cases. Due to
the online test generation approach, these test cases have already
been executed in the generation step. Nevertheless, test execution is
organized as a separate step to investigate any failing tests that have
been generated but also to analyze the results produced by all other
test (e.g. to evaluate specific attacks) while closely monitoring the
SUT. Furthermore, by separating test generation and test execution,
the generated tests can be executed multiple times as regression
tests, in different test environments, and for varying configurations
of the SUT [3].
3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A demonstrator for automated security testing has been built for
the use case of secure data exchange for distributed connected
devices in an untrusted environment. The approach is shown for
data hubs using the MQTT messaging protocol as system under
test (SUT). Security testing has been aligned with potential threats
identified in a security risk assessment-based threat model, which,
derived as described above, also poses one of this work’s results. The
demonstrator has been developed to confirm the technical feasibility
of the approach and to explore new opportunities for automation
in the integration of threat modeling and security testing.
4 OUTLOOK
In this paper, we described the seamless integration of automated
security testing for IoT systems with risk analysis-enhanced threat
modeling. The demonstrator, so far, has been used to confirm the
principal technical feasibility of the approach. However, some prac-
tical problems need yet to be solved to provide a fully automated
cybersecurity testing solution: on the one hand the template for
the threat model needs to be extended with properties of modelled
nodes (e.g. OS or network parameters) that would be needed by
the TCG execution to instantiate a proper SUT test environment as
well as threat parameters. Secondly, there is significant engineering
work to perform in order to actually implement attacks for the
derived threats inside the TCG system. Also, the system so far lacks
a driver for valid input. This is part of ongoing work, as well as
exploring further automation opportunities, in particular a threat
coverage analysis, differential and compatibility testing, as well as
system and environment modeling.
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